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Abstract 
The counterterrorism approach is still harnessed to tackle the spread of 
radical movement and it is deemed to be a soft strategy for a long-term 
purpose. In the several past years, the government has been conducting de-
radicalization program in attempt to bring the terrorist inmates safely to 
social life after the prison release. This program commonly conducted in the 
prison while the inmates serving the jail time for terrorism-related offences. 
Nevertheless, debates rise due to the fail of the program results which prove 
some recidivists appear to execute another terror attack. An opinion of 
prison environment which is considered as a potential breeding ground for 
radicalization aggravates the government effort to reintegrate the prisoners 
into normal society. This worsened by the activities like recruiting other 
prisoners and supporting extremist groups from prison which still often 
occur in Indonesia. Taking two examples from international scope, France 
has announced to close its de-radicalization program, meanwhile United 
States under Trump’s leadership prefer to heightened the sentences related 
to terrorism and to ban Muslim migrants excessively. Meanwhile, 
Indonesia still convinces that de-radicalization program is one of the most 
strategic approaches in fighting terrorism, and it is deemed as a soft 
strategy with a long-term oriented. Therefore, this paper will analyze the 
effectiveness of the program through theories, facts, and phenomenon. Thus 
it will yield some recommendations for Indonesian government in 
strengthening and reshaping its policies. 
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Introduction 
Terror attacks still happen in some 
countries in Western Europe, Turkey, and 
Southeast Asia and it is worsened by the 
calls as a genuine message from Islamic 
State (IS) whose followers have been 
urged to execute terror attacks in their 
home country.  This leads to the increase 
number of terrorist inmates in the prison 
in several past years. Unfortunately, the 
prison has served as recruitment center 
and headquarters for ideological extremist 
(Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013). In 
addition, according to Neuman (2010), 
prisons are places of vulnerability which 
produce identity seekers, protection 
seekers, and rebels in a greater number 
than other environments. Prison also often 
gives extremist a chance to regroup and 
preach their radical ideologies, so that 
many prisoners who were not radical 
prior to imprisonment become radicalized 
through the prison environment 
(Johnston, 2009, p.3). Now, the challenge 
is how the government deals with the 
imprisoned extremist who cannot be 
assured to reintegrate with the society 
after the release. According to Ismail and 
Sim (2016), in 2013, the National Agency 
for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) said that 
25 out 300 terrorists released from prison 
had gone back to their old terror habits, 
and it estimated that the recidivism rate to 
be at least 15 percent now. This number is 
not counted yet for some who just went to 
Syria to join IS after release, which more 
convincing that prison does not change 
their extremist beliefs. 
Some questions like – where will 
they go? Who will monitor them? Will 
they re-offend? Or whether they will be 
turned away from terrorism after the 
release from the prison will be challenged 
(Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p.268). The 
matter is there is no valid program that is 
claimed to be a success in running de-
radicalization, and there are still many 
factors such cultural, psychological, and 
educational are involved.   In Australia, 
consequently, programs have been 
deemed pointless and criticized by some 
influential Muslims (The Guardian, 2016). 
The de-radicalization approach seems to 
fail to build a constructive thought in 
battling the extremist idea, which causes 
more funds are used without any 
significant results. There is still a debate in 
the word of the ‚de-radicalization‛ itself 
because there is no consensus on what it 
really means and ends. In contrary, 
Hikam (2016) argued that the Indonesian 
government should still depend on the de-
radicalization program because it is a soft 
approach that involves public 
participation. Therefore, this paper wants 
to assess whether the de-radicalization 
program in Southeast Asia is effective or 
not. There are three ASEAN countries 
chosen for the objects in this paper, those 
are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
According to Kurlantzick (2018), both 
countries are considered as the leader at a 
regional level whose population is 
Muslim majority and has been helping up 
as a global example of democratization. 
Meanwhile, Dr. Kumar Ramakrisna, head 
of policy studies in RSIS (S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies), claims 
that terrorist (ISIS) is going a step further 
to consider carrying out the attack in the 
strategic hub and international port in 
Singapore’s territory. Moreover, 
Singapore considered as one of the 
countries in the ‚crusader coalition‛ that 
terror group was battling (Cheong, 2017). 
These reasons have limited the range of 
objects into only three countries at the 
regional level. 
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Theory 
De-Radicalization 
Ashour (2008) defines de-
radicalization as a process in which 
radical group reverses its ideology and 
de-legitimizes the use of violent methods 
to achieve political goals while moving 
towards an acceptance of gradual, 
political and economic changes within a 
pluralistic context.  In addition, according 
to Rafique and Ahmed (2013), the de-
radicalization program is the process of 
abandoning an extremist worldview and 
concluding that it is not acceptable to use 
violence to affect social changed–
radicalization. It should not be considered 
soft, but strategic because de-
radicalization aims to prevent further 
escalation of violence (Dechesne, 2011; 
p.288). This makes de-radicalization is 
different with disengagement because it 
involves an approach to build a 
conductive dialogue the inmates. 
Therefore, many claims that de-
radicalization is a significant strategic tool 
in tackling terrorism, and unsurprisingly 
conducted by many countries. 
Based on Dechesne (2014; p. 179 – 
180), there are four strategic uses of the 
de-radicalization, firstly, it is excessively 
used in its response against a more 
flexible and agile opponent that can hide 
in a larger crowd (civil society); secondly, it 
highlights the difference between de-
radicalization, military, and repressive 
way; thirdly, it can occur spontaneously; 
and fourthly, it pertains to the cognitive 
side of radicalism comprising attitudes, 
values, and belief.  In the case of 
Indonesia, according to Rabasa, et al. 
(2010), the de-radicalization has an 
approach which operates at two levels, 
first,   it seeks to develop intelligence on 
the terrorist network and second is to 
return detainees to society, thus the key 
objective does not to change the terrorist’s 
mindset, but to obtain intelligence on the 
terrorist network in order to disrupt it and 
prevent the terrorist attack. 
Indonesian government prefers to 
use cultural aspect as a tool to find a 
solution to urgently change the mind-set 
of terrorist prisoners. The cultural 
approach has been used due to a humane 
way and developed bonds, which are 
believed by each other to disrupt the 
spread of radical ideology and mitigate 
the extremist character inmates in prison 
(Martin, 2007). Unfortunately, the debates 
on the de-radicalization still appear and 
are due to the no effective outcomes. 
Istiqomah (2011) said that the de-
radicalization program in Indonesia still 
needs to be evaluated and improved due 
to limited knowledge and understanding 
from the apparatus personnel about how 
to de-radicalize terrorist inmates. This 
sometimes worsened by the lack of 
inclusiveness means of it and how to run a 
clear de-radicalization program in prisons. 
Radicalization 
Before continuing the analysis of a 
soft and strategic power which is 
represented by the de-radicalization 
program, the concept of radicalization 
needs to be analyzed further. Payne (2009) 
claimed that radicalized ideology leads 
the subject in having extreme ideas and it 
is deemed as the ‚battle of idea‛, not ‚war 
on terror‛, and yet the ideas are still 
believed as the questions of which ideas, 
among whom, and at what level of 
extremism continue to be debated. Alonso 
et al. (2008) argue that the radicalism is 
also an ideology that challenges the 
legitimacy of established norms to lead to 
violence act, but there can be also 
radicalism without the advocacy of 
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violence to strive for the relations of social 
change. 
There are four steps that people 
turn to be radicalized person. Silber and 
Bhatt (2007) said that the four levels are 
(1) pre-radicalization phase; (2) self-
identification phase; (3) indoctrination 
phase; and (4) jihadization phase, in which 
each phase consists a different condition, 
particularly on the leverage of the subject 
itself before they already become a 
perpetrator.  The first stage of the 
radicalization process shows that the 
condition of the individual is normal 
before they start to involve in the militant 
activities. The second stage is self-
identification, which the individual keen 
to learn and understand the radical 
ideology which indirectly leads them to 
form irrational ideas. The third stage 
shows that the individuals tend to learn 
the radical ideology, and the last stage 
points the individuals accept and obey the 
leader command in Jihad participating 
(Aslam, Othman, & Rosili, 2016; p. 154). 
Moreover, radicalization emerges 
when an individual has adopted an 
extremist worldview that is rejected by 
main-stream society (Hafez and Mullins, 
2015). Therefore, they often legitimate the 
use of violence as a method to affect 
societal change.  Recently, the radicals 
often act to be connected with the Islamist 
extremist. Borum (2011; p.13) stated that 
opinion is hardly rejected due to the facts 
that many violent acts are committed by 
those who support Islam extremist. This is 
because of Islamist ideology that might 
pose a security concern, particularly those 
that are anti-democracy and often blame 
the West for all Islam’s problem, and may 
support directly or indirectly, or condone 
the acts of terrorism. Lastly, Hikam (2016) 
claimed that radicalization is the 
ideological process which is very vital, 
thus its spread must be halted earlier 
when the government wants to cut or at 
least to mitigate the radicalization issues. 
It is not surprising that not many 
countries face the threats of radical views 
from their own citizens who now tend to 
be affected easily. One of the critical cases 
is the rising of ISIS ideology which boosts 
the number of radicals groups and 
supporters. 
Counter-Radicalization 
While the de-radicalization 
program focuses on rehabilitating 
radicalized people in order to re-integrate 
them into the society, counter-
radicalization has an anticipatory action. 
As quoted by (Schmid, 2013, p.50), it seeks 
to prevent members from the non-
radicalized population from being 
radicalized, and it comprises in three 
ways namely, (1) counter-grievance, (2) 
counter-ideology, and (3) counter-
mobilization. First, most of the terrorist 
often legitimate their grievances (Krauter, 
2015) due to the economic, social, and 
political issues, thus the effort of counter-
radicalization has the purpose to tackle 
these grievances which quite often 
become the reasons why some people 
become terrorist. Second, before terrorist 
group promoting their extremist ideology, 
the security apparatus must counter it to 
prevent its spreading. Previously, Rana 
(2008) emphasize the importance to 
neutralize the extremist narrative before 
becomes a popular theme in public. Once 
it becomes popular, the ideology will 
become an encouraging drive in rising of 
radicalism movement. Third, countering-
mobilization helps the people to 
disconnect extremist networks and 
knowledge. 
As Powell (2016, p. 58) claim that 
counter-radicalization is a prevent 
strategy, thus a multi approaches are 
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needed. Not only social and economic 
approaches but surveillance and 
intelligence strategies, including military, 
are important too. In the polarized debate 
of counter-radicalization theory, there are 
two major views, first, the group who sees 
social and economic (soft strategy) and 
second is the group who emphasizes the 
importance of counter-intelligence and 
coercive action. (Taspinar, 2009, p.75). 
The approach of counter-
radicalization still avoids the hard strategy, 
because the strategy itself is empowering 
the community itself. In other words, the 
resilience of the community is 
strengthened by the proper understanding 
of ideology, religion, and even culture. 
Again, Schmid (2013, p.50) states that to 
strengthen the capacity building, there are 
four ways that must be done in counter-
radicalization program, namely (1) 
expanding focus from violent to non-
violent extremism; (2) empowering 
mainstream Moslem voice; (3) addressing 
the local grievances as local issues; and (4) 
promoting prosperity and democracy. 
These four steps are absolutely not-
military approach. The implementation 
can be done through the relations between 
government apparatus and society, 
especially religion figures. Tackling the 
grievances issues such as poverty, 
injustice, and inequality must use soft 
strategy and usually it takes long time 
planning. 
In addition, Trethewey and 
Corman (2009) add the four elements 
inside the counter-radicalization, those are 
naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, 
and structuring. Naturalizing means 
restoring socially constructed by facing all 
belief and meaning behind the extremist 
ideology that jeopardizes public 
assumptions. This approach must need 
some process as Borum (2011, p.8) said 
radical beliefs are a proxy. Meanwhile, 
obscuring means to omit the 
contradictions behavior between extremist 
and public opinion, in which the behavior 
of extremist is a key factor to be assessed 
to determine whether there is a risk or not 
(Klausen et al, 2016). The effort of 
universalizing means to understand the 
interest and influence of all terror group 
leaders. All of them must have the 
universal or common goals to establish 
the state under the Islamic law. To 
implement universalizing target in 
counter-terrorism program, thus engaging 
subgroups and their leader, politicizing 
the differences in interest is necessary 
(Schmid, 2013). And lastly, structuring 
means to preserve the prevailing ideology 
by empowering rules and resources. 
Taking an example in Indonesia, the 
ideology of Pancasila used to fight back 
radicalization movement and to structure 
the social system (Rahman, 2017). 
Counter-Terrorism 
Previously, the definition of 
terrorism is a political act that stands at 
once at the nexus between individual and 
collective action (Gurr and Marshall in 
Schmid, 2013). And there is another 
definition by Matusitz (2013) who stated 
that terrorism is the use of violence or 
threat of violence in the pursuit of 
political, religious, ideological, or social 
objectives. There are many definitions of 
terrorism; there is no universal and 
absolute consent on the definition due to 
the complex and multi-approach on its 
problem-solving. To counter or to end 
terrorism, it cannot be done by a single 
approach, both military and non-military 
are used by the state. In 2003, US National 
Grand Strategy combatted terrorism by 
attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; 
command, control, and communications; 
material support; and finances. This 
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approach will have a cascading effect 
across the larger terrorist landscape, 
disrupting the terrorist’s ability to plan 
and operate (CIA.gov, 2013). Meanwhile, 
European Union have established four 
ways in conducting counter terrorism, 
first, preventing people to terrorism by 
tackling the factor or root cause; second, 
protecting citizens and infrastructure and 
reduce our vulnerability attack, third, 
pursuing and investigating across the 
borders and globally from terror attack; 
and four, managing and minimizing the 
consequence of terrorist attack (EUCT, 
2005).  In addition, Cronin (2009) said that 
to end terrorism, the state can decapitate 
like catching or killing the group leader or 
even negotiating (non-military way) 
which aims to transit toward a legitimate 
political process. Cronin (2012, p.192) gave 
an example of killing Osama bin Laden 
considered as the US Grand strategy 
counter terrorism, and it is believed that 
helping US to prevent Al-Qaeda influence 
in the world, especially in the US. The 
influence of the head of group terror is 
very significant. They have a moral effect 
to develop their influence to the terror 
group, especially their ideology. Although 
killing leaders does not completely destroy 
terror group, but Fisher (2016) said that 
killing group terror should weaken the 
organization (ISIS), especially depriving 
its direction and radical ideology spread. 
Stopping this means to support the effort 
of counter-radicalism too by other means 
or hard power. Moreover, preventing 
radicalism influence could be done by 
reducing support of all kinds of group 
terror (Powell, 2016, p.50). Bearing in the 
mind that group terror like ISIS, Al-
Qaeda, and Boko Haram must have its 
bureaucracy/level (Fisher, 2016); therefore 
using hard power to diminishing its figure 
could help countries to hamper radicalism 
influence from group terror. Therefore, 
the main difference between countering 
radicalization and terrorism is using what 
power in diminishing terror movement. 
Soft approach (non-military) can be used 
both for counter-radicalization and 
terrorism; meanwhile hard power 
(military) is only used to end terrorism. 
De-radicalization Programs in Southeast 
Asia Countries 
Indonesia 
The government has established 
the National Agency for Combating 
Terrorism (Badan National Penanggulangan 
Terorisme/BNPT) through Presidential 
Decree No. 46 of 2010. This agency has 
three main duties, first to establish 
national policies, strategies, and 
counterterrorism programs; second, to 
coordinate related government agencies in 
the field of counterterrorism; and third, to 
implement the policy by forming the task 
forces consisting of elements of relevant 
government agencies (BNPT, 2017). In 
addition, Sari (2016; p.73), stated that to 
perform the de-radicalization, BNPT has 
three main coaching programs, which are 
personality mentoring, independency 
mentoring, and continuous mentoring. 
Personality mentoring aims to fix the 
radical ideology which is not in 
accordance with the philosophy of 
Pancasila. This mentoring is being done 
with the help of the inmate’s family who 
supports the program. Meanwhile, the 
independency mentoring aims to equip 
the inmates with soft-skills to get the work 
after release from the prison. The soft-
skills are needed to develop and enhance 
every detainee capability, thus they will 
be more ready for the integration process 
with the civil society. Lastly, the 
continuous mentoring aims to prevent the 
potential of post-release recidivism. 
In the mid-2017, the Bambu Apus 
Prison has sent 152 inmates to their 
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hometown across Indonesia, and this 
deemed as the successful of the de-
radicalization program. (Halim, 2017). 
Parameswaran (2016), said that 
Indonesian government has promised to 
increase the fund of de-radicalization 
efforts due to the concern of the 
indoctrination of prisoners to become IS 
supporters behind the bars. The 
Indonesian government efforts to tackle 
the terrorism and radical groups must be 
praised, because since 2002, Indonesia has 
experimented initiatives aimed at the 
countering violent extremism as can be 
seen with the establishment of BNPT in 
2010. (Sumpter, 2017). Moreover, BNPT’s 
programs consist of ‚a cultural 
interrogation approach‛, whereby the 
officers displayed their own faith of Islam, 
treated detainees with the respect and 
attempted to build trust (Rabasa in 
Sumpter, 2017; p.117). 
Malaysia 
The major Malaysian de-
radicalization initiative is by introducing 
the Religious Rehabilitation Program. 
Most of the programs are based on re-
education and rehabilitation. Re-
education focuses on correcting the 
political and religious misconceptions of 
the militants, while the strategy of 
rehabilitation is adopted for monitoring of 
the militants after their release (Noor & 
Hayat in Aslam et al., 2016; p.157). 
Subsequently, the rehabilitation proves is 
divided into four phases. First, counselors 
and the police extricate radical ideology or 
twisted Islamic perception; second, 
counselors open the discussion to address 
the misunderstood ideologies; third, all 
twisted Islamic ideologies are replaced by 
correct interpretations of the Holy Quran, 
and lastly, the process is continued by 
education program about Islam 
comprehensively (Aslam et all, 2016; p. 
158). The Malaysian de-radicalization 
program is under the Royal Malaysian 
Police, and it claimed the success by 95%. 
Most of the inmates had successfully 
reintegrated which only five percent 
returned to recidivist. (Ismail, 2016). 
Singapore 
Even though the case of violent 
attacks in Singapore is far less than 
Indonesia, but three out of four 
Singaporeans believe that it is only a 
matter of time before the country comes 
under a terror attack, with Changi Airport 
the likeliest target. (Cheong, Tan, and 
Qing, 2016). This survey has been 
conducted after the Brussels’s Airport 
attack which killed 30 people and injured 
more than 300 people. Moreover, Lam 
(2017), said the Ministry of Home Affairs 
of Singapore confirmed that the country 
was specifically targeted by terrorist 
groups in the past years and the terrorism 
threat to the country remains the highest 
in recent years, as ISIS has been linked to 
several violence cases in Southeast Asia 
Countries. 
Due to the least number of terrorist 
attacks, Singapore has preferred to 
conduct the CVE (Countering Violent 
Extremist) rather than to focus on de-
radicalization. The CVE program has been 
conducted through the courses given to all 
students to understand a theoretical 
foundation in countering violent extremist 
and radicalization (Taylor and Romano, 
2015). The efforts from Singaporean 
government differ compared to other 
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The government prefers to conduct the 
‚vetting process‛ to check whether its 
society have been influenced by radical’s 
views or not. Aslam et al. (2016) said that 
the vetting process aims to screen the 
potential detainees actively involved in 
terrorism. Throughout the process, the 
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terrorist detainees will be reviewed by the 
psychologist and given security 
assessment. 
The Failure, Debate, and Assessment of 
De-radicalization Program 
The Case in France 
Apart from Southeast Asian 
countries, France has announced that they 
will shutter its first and only de-
radicalization center for Islamic extremist 
in the mid-2017, because its 
experimentation was claimed 
unsuccessful (Chasmar, 2017). The France 
de-radicalization center which is called as 
‚The Pontourny Centre‛ is the voluntary 
center and has nine participants only who 
none of them completed the program. 
Spencer (2017), argued that de-
radicalization programs which the West 
Countries has placed so much hope have 
long been a failure. This is because the 
Holy Koran and Sunnah are full of 
commands to make war against the 
unbelievers, and the idea that Jihadist can 
be ‚de-radicalized‛ by reference to them 
is just a myth told to infidel authorities to 
lull them into complacency. Previously, in 
2016, 400 people were arrested on 
suspicion of links to jihadist groups, and 
2,400 people and 1,000 families are 
actively monitored. This data also linked 
to the Bataclan attacks which killed 
around 120 people (Euronews, 2017). This 
is why, in the beginning, France really 
depends on the de-radicalization program 
which designated to the young people 
between 18 – 30 ages to halt their 
association to IS. 
Unfortunately, the fact that France 
Government officially closed its de-
radicalization program has opened the 
debates among experts in examining 
whether the program is effectively run or 
not in diminishing the radicals group. 
McAuley (2017), said that the failure 
caused by the lack of evaluation of the 
mechanisms set up by the state in the area 
of taking responsibility for radicalization 
and the lack of a comprehensive 
prevention strategy. Moreover, some 
believe that trying to change the 
perspective of the radical people is not 
working, thus the effort of preventive 
measures are more fit and preferable. The 
report from France implies that de-
radicalization does not work because most 
Islamic radicals do not want to be de-
radicalized. This can be seen by the fact 
that from 8,250 Islamic radicals, only 59 
people have inquired about going to 
France de-radicalization center 
(Pontourny) since its opening. Among 
those, only 17 submitted applications and 
just nine arrived and not a single resident 
has completed the full ten-month 
curriculum (Kern, 2017). 
Another reason of France de-
radicalization program failure was the 
issue of volunteering, which deemed as 
the crucial factor that leads into the 
failure. Crowell (2017) said that the issue 
of volunteering was very problematic, 
because it was impossible to someone to 
declare himself as a radicalized people 
and announce that he needs a treatment to 
de-radicalize his mind. The ambiguity of 
the term of ‚radicalization‛ becomes the 
question, because radicalization is 
subjective and cannot be categorized as an 
illness or like suffering from addiction. 
Some experts continue to argue that 
government is not supposed to use the de-
radicalization term because they cannot 
invent a vaccine against the radical 
temptation/Islamist (Dunleavy, 2016). In 
the beginning, de-radicalization should 
not take a radical inmate as a patient like 
in the hospital, but unfortunately, some 
de-radicalization, particularly in France, 
implement the programs similar with the 
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drugs rehabilitation in prison which 
actually very contradict in dealing the 
terrorist prisoners. 
De-radicalization Program: Are They 
Effective? 
It is not easy as some people think 
in running the de-radicalization program. 
Sometimes, it is hampered by the 
definition of radicalization itself. Yusuf 
(2016) said the term of ‚radicalization‛ is 
defined in an extremely broad manner, 
and this becomes more especially difficult 
given that the concept of 
terrorism/radicalism is so contested and 
politically loaded. This lead to the 
government, for instance Australia, to 
more prefer the policy of ‚countering 
violent extremism‛ rather depend on their 
de-radicalization program too much. As a 
matter of a fact, the Australian 
government has developed a parallel 
criminal justice specifically for acts 
deemed ‚terrorist/radical acts‛ (Yusuf, 
2016). This show the complexity of de-
radicalization occurred, and some believe 
the program is too instant in removing the 
radical ideology which already inhibited 
in every mind of prisoners. Moreover, 
some countries are still finding the best 
format to implement the de-radicalization 
program, and of course the program must 
be realistically run. 
If we saw violence caused by 
recidivism, means that the de-
radicalization program is failed. Actually, 
the facts of recent attacks in the UK and 
Western Europe from the Charlie Hebdo in 
France and Lee Rigby in the UK point the 
repeated of terrorist recidivism. , rates of 
recidivism are understood to be legitimate 
markers of a program’s success, and 
indeed, they are consistently referred to 
when discussing the effectiveness of 
programs and initiatives (Koehler, 2017; P. 
172). There is no a certainty to assure that 
there will be no recidivism in the 
upcoming years after the release. Even 
though the recidivism rate among terrorist 
can be consistently lower than ‘normal 
criminals’ but still it will be always used 
as a measurement whether the program is 
success or not. Only in Saudi Arabia who 
claimed 0 percent of recidivism, but 
meanwhile in Europe the rate is nearly 30-
40 percent (Pettinger, 2017; p. 11). 
In the case of UK, Marsden (2015), 
said the de-radicalization program still 
needs to be explored, thus it will have a 
clear set of metrics that reflect what 
successful reintegration ‘looks like’. The 
program should notice on ‘push and pull’ 
factors to make sure the ex-prisoners are 
not surprised when they try to integrate 
with the community. The push factors 
deemed as the reaction to leave the group 
because he/she has lost a faith in it. 
Meanwhile, the pull factors underline the 
essence of achieving a normal life after 
prison, so the financial incentives, the jobs, 
and the support from the family are 
important. In further explanation, Bjorgo 
in Johnston (2009; p.12), explained Push 
factors may consist of a loss of faith in the 
ideology of the group or the feelings that 
the violence went too far or even the loss 
of confidence in the group. Meanwhile, 
pull factors consist of a longing for the 
freedoms of a ‘normal’ life‛. 
Previously, many scholars have 
distinguished the meaning of de-
radicalization and disengagement. 
According to Kruglanski et al. (2014; p.87), 
disengagement denotes the 
discontinuation of active participation in 
violence whereas de-radicalization 
denotes a belief system that supports 
violence. This means the de-radicalization 
program focus on halting the ideology 
which has been portrayed as a triggering 
and motivating key factor. The challenge 
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is can the program change the radical 
ideology to normal perspective? In which, 
it is difficult to measure its progress. It 
becomes harder when de-radicalization 
program occurs when a group or an 
individual no longer believe in a violent 
ideology; meanwhile ‘disengagement’ 
occurs when a group or people no longer 
engage in violence (Johnston, 2009; p. 9). 
This is a key point why conducting de-
radicalization program is much more 
difficult rather than disengagement. It will 
take a very long time to convince inmates 
to leave the radical view behind, rather to 
stop being engaged in any kind of violent 
acts. 
More critics come from Dechesne 
(2011; p. 2), who said that de-
radicalization may not require any 
coordinated action to get it underway, or 
in other words, de-radicalization may rise 
spontaneously. This means that structured 
programs do not guarantee a success to 
eliminate radicals view in every inmate’s 
head. On the contrary, many countries 
still depend on the structured programs to 
run de-radicalization strategy, and this 
cost a high amount of state budget. If the 
de-radicalization process is really 
occurred in the ‘spontaneously stage’, 
then every structured programs are a 
waste of government spending. This has 
been criticized by some scholars who 
believe that the de-radicalization program 
tends to spend budget inefficiently. 
Assessing the De-Radicalization Program 
in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore 
Assessing the progress of the de-
radicalization program in those countries 
will give the results whether the programs 
run effectively or not. Both Indonesia and 
Malaysia are countries in which Muslim is 
the highest population and they are still 
depending on the de-radicalization 
program to minimize the number of 
radical groups. 
Indonesia 
Performing the program in prison 
clearly needs an adequate fund and 
reliable practitioners, especially the 
person who capable in teaching the Koran 
meanings without against any law in 
Indonesia. Moreover, the practitioners 
must have the ability in approaching 
inmates and his families and networks.  
The family connection is a vital part to 
success the program, so the family 
support from outside prison is clearly 
needed, and it is a responsibility for the 
practitioner to make it happens 
continually. The failure of the program is 
usually caused by the instant process, so 
the program officer cannot understand the 
root of the problems why the inmates still 
stand with their radical paradigm.  From 
the previous research, Sukabdi (2015) 
found that some inmates believe the de-
radicalization program does not alter their 
views and they do not understand on 
what strategy the government will change 
them into normal people. In addition, 
from the FGD and interview, Sukabdi 
found an inmate who totally denies the 
program. He believes the program cannot 
change his heart to love Allah and Jihad, 
and only possible to stop bombing 
(Sukabdi, 2015). 
To assess whether the program is 
success or not, I evaluate the behavior 
transformation of every inmate who just 
follows the program routinely. It is not 
easy to assure them to avert their 
behavior, from pro-violence to contra-
violence, moreover for the challenge for 
them to integrate with the social 
community after the release. In this 
reason, Sapiie (2016) said that the program 
is not really optimal because it cannot 
convince the former terrorist to return 
Journal of ASEAN Studies  145 
 
back to society after serving their 
sentences. In fact, the main purpose of the 
program is to bring the ex-extremist to 
their community, but unfortunately, it is 
contradicted by the facts that many 
recidivists joined their previous radical 
group. This can be seen by the case of 
Thamrin attack in 2016, which one of the 
five perpetrators was a former terrorist 
convict, thus it was a concrete example of 
the de-radicalization program failure 
(Sapiie, 2016). Finding this fact, the result 
of de-radicalization program obviously 
needs to be assessed in some certain 
stages. 
Lestari (2016), moreover, said that 
the de-radicalization program in 
Indonesia is under fire. Her opinion is 
same with the previous reason, because 
the terror attacks have continued with the 
perpetrator who just released from prison 
bars. It also shows the example of the 
police’s inability to completely monitor 
the former detainees in terrorism-related 
cases. Another reason that points the 
failure of the program is the accessibility 
in every prison. This means that every 
crowded prison actually is no longer 
effective to run program. In fact, the more 
crowded prison, the bigger the possibility 
to spread the extremist ideas among 
detainees, thus many international experts 
still claim that a breeding ground for 
Islamic extremism (Beech, 2016). 
The general results from assessing 
de-radicalization program shows three 
answers; first, many prisons lack of 
capable staff who runs the program. The 
officer with the educational background 
of social-security science is really needed 
to back up the prison. It is a different 
matter if the prison still uses the staff who 
only capable in engaging criminal acts to 
run the de-radicalization program. Second, 
the program often stops after the release; 
in fact it should maintain the life of ex-
prisoners outside the bars. The 
government has a difficulty in seeing ex-
prisoner’s network in his new 
environment. Due to this, the government 
has failed in solving the question why 
there are still many recidivists perform 
terror acts. And the last one is the 
condition of the prison that too 
overcrowded, so the program could not 
run effectively. Even though the program 
has been implemented by the capable 
staff, but as long as the prison 
environment is not supported with the 
good condition, hence the desired goals 
cannot be achieved. 
In addition, from the primary data 
taken from the field research by Samto 
Isnanto (2017), the number of inmates of 
terrorism cases in prisons until 2015 has 
reached 215 people in 47 prisons scattered 
in 13 provinces, which can be seen from 
Table 1. 
From his research from 2009-2015 
in Surakarta Prison, Isnanto found that the 
challenges do not come from the inmates, 
rather the prison officer or supervisor who 
do not possess special ability in 
conducting the de-radicalization program. 
Mostly, the officer/supervisor only has the 
understanding of law enforcement and 
criminalization, thus the lack of human 
resources readiness, facility resources, 
guidance preparation, and control-
monitor still persist. 
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Table 1. The Capture of Terrorists in Indonesia Until 2014 
No Status Total 
Indonesia 
1 Inmates in prison  215 
2 Released from prison 598 
3 Death penalty 3 
4 Killed in the scene 103 
Foreign Countries 
1 Repatriated from Turkey 169 
2 Killed in Syria 53 
3 Suicide bombing 4 
Source: Isnanto (2017) 
 
Malaysia 
Looking to the neighbor country – 
Malaysia, seems they are really 
appreciated by the international 
community. Malaysia has achieved 
recognition from international 
organizations over the success of its de-
radicalization program. The government 
has claimed a total of 130 people were 
arrested in connection with IS, and had 
been placed under the program. Malaysia 
has succeeded to collaborate through the 
Welfare Ministry to support the finance 
for the program and many psychological 
experts (Povera, 2016). Malaysia’s 
advantage compared to Indonesia is they 
have formally enacted the relationship 
between the prison with welfare 
department, which is very important to 
make sure the prosperity and safety of 
every inmate after the release. Meanwhile, 
Indonesia seems still need to find the best 
format to build the relationship between 
the related stakeholders. This is much 
contradicted with the Malaysia’s 
achievement which claims the success rate 
in implementing de-radicalization by 95%. 
This is caused by the Malaysian 
government effort who success in 
building and modifying its experience to 
design rehabilitation program in order to 
respond to the current generation of 
Islamist militants (Besant, 2016).  
Moreover, Malaysia also strengthens the 
relationship with the neighbor states, 
particularly in exchanging the ideas on 
de-radicalization and rehabilitation. This 
makes this country has a knowledge 
advantage to perform their program 
compared to Indonesia. 
Having a success implemented 
strategy lead Malaysia to set broader 
discussion in the international level. 
Malaysia’s counterpart in exchanging the 
views on de-radicalization is not only 
ASEAN members, but international states 
like US, Japan, and South Korea. Malaysia 
has a good image in annihilating the 
communist influence during 1960’s, and 
the method in combatting communist has 
been transformed to fight IS threats. 
According to Najimi and Ramli (2016), 
Journal of ASEAN Studies  147 
 
Malaysia has a long experience in the de-
radicalization program due to the 
successful of campaigning against a 
communist insurgency in the aftermath of 
World War. This makes Malaysia has a 
standard temple on diminishing any kind 
of radical perspective in their country. 
Their standard temple is clearly 
considered as the good method, which can 
be seen by the few of number terror 
attacks. Moreover, there is no case of 
recidivism who conducts terror attack in 
the last several years in Malaysia. 
Singapore 
Since 2007, Singapore has been 
aware with the potential threat from 
radicals group, thus the government has 
gathered 122 Muslim organizations to 
condemn and reject the ideological 
extremism (Hassan, 2007).  After that, the 
number of terror attacks in Singapore is 
none until now. Even though the number 
or attacks is none, but the government still 
has a procedure for de-radicalization 
program such counseling time and 
financial support for the detainee. Aslam 
et al. (2016; p. 158) said that Singapore has 
performed continuous and comprehensive 
efforts undertaken by the government to 
combat terrorism, which should be 
praised and improved in the de-
radicalization program is an obligatory 
with the uncertainty of political 
atmosphere at present to ensure harmony 
among the citizens are protected and to 
ensure national security free from 
militancy which sought to develop 
radicalism around the world. 
Even though, there are no terror 
attacks in Singapore, but in September 
2017, the government under ISA 
(International Security Act) has arrested 
two suspects – Imran Kassim (male) and 
Shakiran Begam (female), who tried to go 
to Syria for Jihad purpose (Channel News 
Asia, 2017). The screening has been 
performed well by Singapore because the 
government has vowed to not let any 
Singaporean to become radicalized. The 
government emphasizes the effort of 
disengagement, for instance adding the 
policy to screen every citizen they have. 
This is not hard compared to Indonesia, 
because Singapore citizen is only 5.6 
million, or only half of Jakarta. 
Prioritizing Counter-Terrorism through 
Military Operation Other Than War 
(MOOTW) Policy 
Tackling terrorism issues is quite 
complex and it takes many approaches. 
Due to the fail of the de-radicalization 
program in France and the rising debate 
of de-radicalization, thus the effort must 
put forward the preventive way that 
seems more plausible. Powell (2016) 
affirmed that the objectives of preventing 
(countering) will be achieved by 
responding immediately and working 
with a wide range of sectors.  To response 
terrorism threats, the government can 
implement the military other than to 
optimize what security apparatus have 
done. In Indonesia case, Supriyatno (2014, 
p.218), said that Military Operation Other 
Than War (MOOTW) – Operasi Militer 
Selain Perang (OMSP) in Indonesian – can 
be used to tackle non-military threats such 
as terrorism, even though it requires 
political decisions from parliament. 
Using MOOTW actually is like to 
combine the military-intelligence-
territorial operations, which aims to 
secure the territory security. For the US 
case, their counter-terrorism forces are 
active in 40 percent of the world’s 
countries (76 countries), and their 
presence comes with striking 
repercussions (Besteman and Savell, 
2018). The U.S. has emphasized the ‚war 
on terror‛, and it has been 17 years since 
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the attack of World Trade Center. The US 
government has provided its latest 
military technology and hardware, 
including to training local military 
personnel in Africa and Middle East 
countries. Since 2005, the MOOTW aims 
to end terrorism threats, which Blais 
(2005, p.5) claims that the program has 
provided a quick response measures that 
includes preemptive, retaliatory, rescue 
operations, and normally, counter-
terrorism program requires specially 
trained personnel capable of mounting 
swift and effective action. 
Previously, before the reformation 
era, Indonesia has done the same thing as 
the U.S., in which the qualified personnel 
to tackling the terrorism threats is under 
the responsibility of Special Detachment 
81 (Gultor Kopassus). However, due to 
Anti-terror Law no. 16/2003, terrorism 
handling currently under the control of 
Indonesia Police (Polri) with the formation 
of Detachment-88 in 2003. It is been 15 
years that Polri still fighting terror groups, 
and now the number of personnel have 
been strengthened by the additional of 600 
Densus-88 personnel, bringing the total 
personnel to 1.300 (Soeriaatmadja, 2018). 
The presence of TNI to tackle terrorism 
has decreased significantly and the effort 
of MOOTW seems never to exist, because 
based on the anti-terror Law, Polri is the 
main actor to maintain the security at the 
national level, including terrorist attack. 
This leads to the ineffectiveness of 
MOOTW due the TNI who is not 
supported by the anti-terror law, whereas 
using MOOTW can yield a significant 
result in combating terror groups. As 
quoted by Supriyatno (2014, p.219), there 
are four elements of MOOTW namely 
offense, defense, preventive diplomacy, and 
recovery. The element of offense aims to 
capture the leader and to destroy terrorist 
and networks (Baker, 2007), which, the 
military force (TNI) can be used to help 
Polri implementing its operation. The 
challenge of the synergy between TNI-
Polri is still being debate due to the 
regulations and applicable law. From the 
perspective of Polri, terrorism is 
considered as the criminal acts, thus the 
effort to diminish them still not using the 
MOOTW. In addition, Prasetyo (2016, 
p.46), the implementation of current 
collaboration by TNI-Polri is only limited 
to the policy makers levels at the 
headquarters, however, the collaboration 
at the forefront level such as Military 
Rayon Command/Koramil (Babinsa) and 
Police Sector/Polsek (Bhabinkamtibnas) still 
has not happened yet. Moreover, the 
doctrine of tackling terrorism between 
TNI and Polri is different, as Putranto 
(2014) said that police aims to enforce the 
law, while TNI aims to defend its territory 
from any kind of threats, including 
terrorism. This leads into the debate of 
TNI-Polri collaboration and cannot 
implement MOOTW. The rest MOOTW 
elements (defense, preventive diplomacy, 
and recovery) also cannot be implemented 
as long as Indonesian government still 
finding the best format of TNI-Polri 
collaboration. 
The question is how to implement 
MOOTW, thus TNI can support Polri to 
fighting end terrorism? The answer is 
having the National Security Council 
(Dewan Keamanan Nasional), as Singapore, 
Malaysia, and major players such US, UK, 
and Russia did. As Praditya (2016, p.45) 
said that the main purpose of National 
Security Council is to formulate the 
security policies and strategies, which 
include how to tackle terror attacks by 
TNI assistance. Unfortunately, the draft 
bill (laws) of National Security Council 
has been rejected and still has not received 
approval yet from the parliament (Mukti, 
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2015). The strategy to implement 
MOOTW cannot be run as long as the 
country (Indonesia) possesses National 
Security Council and its law. Again, 
according to Praditya (2016, p.55), 
Singapore already had its national 
security agency called NSCS (National 
Security Coordination Secretariat) which 
formed in 1999. This agency (NSCS) aims 
to strengthen coordination between 
Singapore’s defense agencies (military-
police-intelligence agency), thus they can 
prevent terrorism acts with the assistance 
from the military based on its Law. 
Meanwhile, Malaysia also already had 
National Security Division (Badan 
Keselamatan Negara) which formed in 2006, 
and it aims to coordinate national security 
issues, including terrorism (Praditya, 
2013, p.57). The further explanation can be 
seen by Table 2. 
Meanwhile, if we see major 
players, they have their National Security, 
like National Security Council for the US; 
Security Council of the Russian Federation 
for Russia; and MI5 for the UK. Therefore, 
the conclusion is that the country must 
own its national security acts/council as a 
single entity to coordinate military-police 
in tackling the terror threats. In other 
words, the MOOTW can be done 
effectively to combat terrorism as long as 
there is no law on it. In Indonesia case, 
Polri still regarded as the leading sector 
due to the Laws. 
Solutions for In-effectiveness of 
De-radicalization Program 
There are some strategic solutions 
to answer the debate of the effectiveness 
of de-radicalization, however, the writer 
divides into two conditions: 
1. If the government still keep 
running the de-radicalization 
program: 
First, the program officers in 
prisons must understand the concept of 
de-radicalization, and they cannot only 
have the knowledge background of 
criminal science and extra-ordinary crime. 
Second, program officer in prisons 
can handle the radicalized inmates by 
embracing the existence of their family 
and religion figures. Moreover, the 
program officer has the ability to 
interpreting (tafsir) the Qur’an. 
Third, for Indonesia case, BNPT 
must be authoritatively and financially 
empowered to conduct the de-
radicalization program. The main agenda 
is to provide many qualified program 
officers to oversee de-radicalization 
course. 
 
Table 2. Comparison between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Security Councils 
Countries Security Council  
Indonesia (none) Cannot implement MOOTW optimally 
Malaysia BKN (Badan Keselamatan Negara) Can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus 
could perform MOOTW effectively 
Singapore NSCS (National Security 
Coordination Secretariat) 
Can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus 
could perform MOOTW effectively 
Source: Praditya, 2016; elaborated 
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2. If the government stop the de-
radicalization program (for 
Indonesia case): 
First, empowering the counter-
terrorism policy with the help of military 
(TNI) through MOOTW. This should be 
supported by the applicable laws and 
regulations (revision of anti-terror law) to 
enable the MOOTW works. 
Second, to have National Security 
Council/acts immediately like Singapore 
and Malaysia did, thus the collaboration 
between TNI-Polri would be run effectively 
by one/single entity. 
Third, strengthening the intelligence 
operation to capture the group leader and 
prominent actors of terror, thus their 
influence can be cut immediately. This role 
falls under the BIN (National State 
Intelligence Agency) as the leading sector to 
coordinate TNI and Polri in gathering 
intelligence information. This is very useful 
for Indonesia while the government still 
don’t have National Security Entity. 
Fourth, strengthening joint patrols 
and intelligent sharing through ADMM 
(ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting) to 
secure from terrorist and radicalism 
movement. From Indonesia case, the 
ADMM can be chosen as a place to perform 
Indonesia Defense’s preventive diplomacy. 
Conclusion 
De-radicalization program cannot be 
harnessed as a primary way to annihilate 
the extremist movement, because the 
process to de-radicalize is a long process 
and it is not an instant stage.  There is no 
certain step to de-radicalize inmates, and it 
is still debated among the scholars and 
experts. The government cannot cut the 
radicals ideology immediately, but they can 
stop violence acts which are called as a 
disengagement strategy. Moreover, 
Indonesia needs to re-evaluate what is the 
best format for the de-radicalization 
program, thus it will deliver a desired 
result. And lastly, after comparing the 
program in Indonesia with two neighbor 
countries (Malaysia – Singapore), the 
cultural aspects only deemed as a crucial 
factor only in Indonesia, while others 
depend on the quality of the program 
without engaging cultural approach. 
Meanwhile, the effort to implement 
MOOTW to crush the terror group by TNI 
is still being limited by the applicable Law 
in Indonesia. Until now, Indonesia can only 
perform its counter-terrorism under the 
Polri responsibility. 
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